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The Effect of New Market-Rate
Housing Construction on the
Low-Income Housing Market
Evan Mast
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n There is a heated debate on
whether building new housing
will improve affordability. I
use household migration data
to study this question.
n I find that migrants to
new central city multifamily
buildings come from
neighborhoods with slightly
lower incomes, and migrants
into these neighborhoods come
from areas with still lower
incomes, and so forth.
n Using a simulation model,
I find that 100 new marketrate units ultimately create 70
vacancies in middle-income
neighborhoods.These openings
should lower prices, but the
effect may be small in the least
expensive areas, where prices
are close to the marginal cost
of providing housing.
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Housing costs and the share of income spent
on housing are rising rapidly in many large cities,
inspiring a heated debate on the appropriate policy
response. “Yes-In-My-Backyard” (YIMBY) groups
advocate for market-based strategies that relax
regulation and increase housing construction.
Their rationale is Economics 101: increasing supply
decreases prices.
Opposing groups argue that the YIMBY
position is flawed because unsubsidized new
housing is typically much more expensive than
the housing units that are affordable to middleand low-income households. They claim that
these types of housing are so different that new
construction is irrelevant to rents and home
prices faced by low-income households, and they
advocate for subsidized housing and voucher
programs instead of new market-rate construction.
Prior research has shown that new housing
depreciates and “filters” to become affordable over
the course of decades, but little is known about
shorter timeframes of, say, three to five years—a
horizon that is quite relevant to the acute housing
crunch at the center of the current debate.
One common theory is that a “migration
chain” mechanism could quickly link expensive
new housing to cheaper types of housing. Some
households who would have otherwise occupied
cheaper units move into new units, reducing
demand and lowering prices for the units they
leave vacant. The process iterates when a second
round of households moves into the units the first
round left vacant. This ripple effect spreads out
further and further, eventually reducing prices in
middle- or low-income areas. However, if different
parts of the housing market (like new construction
and low-income neighborhoods) are strongly
separated, with little cross-migration, the chain
may never actually reach areas most in need.

I use data on household address histories to
directly examine this mechanism and shed light on

Individuals frequently move to
neighborhoods that are slightly
different from their previous
neighborhoods, but they rarely
make large jumps.
the effect of new housing on the market for lowerincome housing. I highlight three main findings:
1) Individuals frequently move to neighborhoods
that are slightly different from their previous
neighborhoods, but rarely make large jumps.
This implies that there are divisions between
segments of the market, but they are frequently
crossed.
2) New construction is connected to low-income
areas through a series of moves. To show this, I
identify residents of new multifamily buildings
in large cities, their previous address, the
current residents of those addresses, and so
on. This sequence quickly adds income areas
from the bottom half and even the bottom fifth,
consistent with strong migratory connections.
3) New construction opens the housing market
in low-income areas by reducing demand. A
simulation model suggests that building 100
new market-rate units sparks a chain of moves
that eventually leads 70 people to move out of
neighborhoods from the bottom half of the
income distribution, and 39 people to move
out of neighborhoods from the bottom fifth.
This effect should occur within five years of the
new units’ completion.
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The Ripple Effect of Migration Chains

chain never starts. Similarly, a chain
could end because a unit is filled by a
new household, such as a young adult
moving out of her parents’ house. If
the unit is filled by a household from
outside of the region, the subsequent
benefits no longer accrue to the area
that actually built the housing. The
effect of new housing on lower-income
areas will be stronger the longer chains
last, as there will be more opportunities
to reach such an area.
The other key factor influencing
the power of migration chains is the
strength of migratory connections
between lower-quality housing and
new housing. If there is a part of the
market that is very separated from new
housing—suppose, for example, that
few people move from low-income
areas to middle-income areas—the
chain will not reach that area.

The intuition behind the migration
chain mechanism is simple—new
housing creates a ripple effect that
gradually reaches areas that are more
and more different from the new
housing itself. A person may move
from their old unit that rented for
$2,500 to a new unit that costs $3,000,
and another person may move from
a $2,000 apartment to the unit the
first person vacated. As this chain
continues, it may add housing units
that are affordable to middle- and lowincome households.
However, the importance of
this mechanism in the real world is
complicated by the fact that a chain
can end in each round. For example, if
a new condo is purchased to be used
as a second home, the buyer does not
vacate their previous unit and the
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Figure 1 Migration between Neighborhoods with Different Income Levels
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NOTE: The figure shows the relationship between origin and destination neighborhood income of movers within
the Chicago metropolitan area. Neighborhood income is ranked and grouped into tenths, or deciles. Each
box represents the middle 50 percent of movers from a given origin neighborhood income decile, with the
horizontal red line in the box representing the median mover; the whiskers represent the bottom and top
tenths of movers from the neighborhood income decile.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from Infutor Data Solutions and the U.S. Census Bureau.
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Migratory Connections between New
Construction and Low-Income Areas
Because migratory connections
are a crucial determinant of migration
chains’ effect, I start by using address
history data from Infutor Data
Solutions, a marketing intelligence
company, to broadly examine how
people move across neighborhoods in
the Chicago metropolitan area.1 Figure
1 shows how migrants’ destinations
depend on where they originated.
There are 10 boxes, one for each tenth,
or decile, of the neighborhood (as
defined by census tracts) household
income distribution, with the poorest
origin neighborhoods on the left and
the richest on the right. Each box
shows the range of household income,
again in deciles, for the destination
neighborhoods. For example, among
movers from the second-slowest
neighborhood income decile, the
bottom 10 percent end up in the
poorest neighborhoods, but the median
mover reaches the third income decile
of neighborhood income, the top
quarter reach at least the sixth decile,
and the top 10 percent reach the eighth
decile.
Individuals originating in top decile
income tracts very rarely move to a
below-median income neighborhood,
and few people from lower deciles
migrate above the median. While this
suggests that divisions between types
of neighborhoods exist, these barriers
appear to be permeable. Individuals
frequently move from the seventh
decile to the ninth, the sixth to the
fourth, etc. The top decile and lower
deciles are connected through a series
of moves, which is precisely the sort
of connectivity the migration chain
mechanism requires.
I next sharpen focus to the
migratory connections between new
construction and low-income areas
and track moves at the building level.
I identify 686 large, new, market-rate
multifamily buildings in 12 large
central cities and track 52,000 of their
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current residents to their previous
buildings of residence. I then find
the tenants currently living in those
buildings and track them to their
previous residence, iterating for six
rounds and, in order to focus on local
connectivity, keeping only withinmetro-area moves in each round.
Results are shown in Figure 2.
About 20 percent of residents moving
into the new buildings came from
neighborhoods (census tracts) with
household incomes below the median
for that metro area; this proportion
rises steadily to 40 percent in round
six. Similar patterns emerge for other
characteristics, suggesting strong
chained mobility connections between
different types of neighborhoods. These
relationships are inconsistent with the
idea of a highly segmented market in
which new construction does not affect
low-income areas. The results also
highlight the geographically diffuse
nature of migration chains—only
30 percent of movers in round six
originate within the principal city of
the metro area. This means that market
mechanisms will reach a wide set of
neighborhoods, but also makes it less
likely that any particular neighborhood
will be affected.
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reaches that type of neighborhood
before ending. The intuition is
simple: when a household leaves a
neighborhood, it has an effect similar
to building another (depreciated) unit
in that neighborhood. The household
that left reduces demand by one, while
building a unit increases supply by
one—either way, the result is a newly
vacant unit. This metric fits naturally in
the policy debate, where “inclusionary
zoning” ordinances require developers
to build some income-restricted units
for each market-rate unit.
The simulation results suggest
that market-rate construction has an
important effect on the middle- and
low-income housing markets. In my
baseline specification, 100 new marketrate units create 70 equivalent units
in neighborhoods with household
incomes below the metro area median,
and 39 in neighborhoods with
household incomes from the bottom
fifth. This should open these housing

markets and lower prices, all else equal,
though I do not directly estimate these
implied effects. Notably, however, the
simulation implies these equivalent
units are created within five years of
the completion of the new building.
Policy implications
My results suggest that new marketrate housing construction can improve
the market for housing in low- and
middle-income neighborhoods, even
in the short run. The effects are diffuse
and appear to benefit diverse areas
of a metropolitan area. Policies that
increase market-rate construction are
thus likely to improve affordability
even for housing units that bear little
similarity to the new construction.
These results also suggest that if
policymakers expend the political
capital required to get new housing
proposals through the often subjective
and onerous approval process, there are

Figure 2 Types of Neighborhoods Included in Migration Chain from New Housing
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While these statistics on migratory
connections are useful for showing
general characteristics of the housing
market, they do not quantify the effect
of new housing on the lower-income
market. To do this, I simulate a richer
model that allows migration chains
to end and considers other real-world
complications. The simulation allows
me to estimate an intuitive metric
of a new unit’s effect on other types
of neighborhoods. For each type of
neighborhood—for example, those
with household incomes below the
metro area median—I define the
number of “equivalent units” a new
market-rate housing unit creates as
the probability that its migration chain
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NOTE: The figure plots the percentage of individuals in each round of the migration sequence whose origin
neighborhood had the selected characteristics.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from Infutor Data Solutions and the U.S. Census Bureau.
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likely to be benefits throughout the
region.
However, there are several
shortcomings of the migration chain
mechanism, particularly in the
lowest-cost and most-rent-burdened
neighborhoods. Census tracts in the
bottom fifth of household income
and the top fifth of rent burden
(rent as a share of income) have
an average vacancy rate of 12.8
percent, compared to 8.1 percent
in the rest of my sample. Given
that rents are generally already
low in such neighborhoods, this
suggests that reducing demand
through the migration chain
mechanism is unlikely to lower
costs further, perhaps because rents
have reached the minimum cost of
housing. Moreover, there may also
be important amenity effects if the
migration chain reduces population
in these areas, such as reduced retail
options, school closures, or increased
crime. Vouchers or policies that
lower the cost of housing (such as
reductions in property tax or utility
rates) may be necessary to lower
prices in this segment of the market.
In addition, while I focus on
regional implications, new buildings
could have very different effects on
their immediate area, where they
may change amenities or household
composition in ways that affect prices.
There is little existing direct evidence
on how these factors change following
new construction, and this could be a
fruitful area for future research.
Note
1. I focus on one metropolitan area
because there is large variation across
both race and income in large cities.
Results are similar for other areas.
This article draws on research from an Upjohn Institute
working paper, which can be found at https://research
.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/307.
Evan Mast is an economist at the Upjohn Institute.
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Medical Innovation
and the Employment
of Cancer Patients
R. Vincent Pohl
Cancer is the second-most common
cause of mortality and morbidity in
developed countries. In addition to its
direct costs in terms of quality-adjusted
life years lost, it also contributes to the
economic costs of disease as cancer
patients often reduce their working
hours or cease employment completely.
Recent decades have seen increased
innovation in the treatment of many
types of cancer. Pharmaceutical
innovation has resulted in new
chemotherapy drugs—often used in
combinations—that are more effective
in targeting tumors while reducing
harm for healthy body tissue. In
addition, new surgical techniques
alleviate side effects and lead to shorter
recovery times.
I investigate whether medical
innovation in the treatment of breast
and prostate cancers, which are the
most common types of cancers among
women and men, respectively, also
lead to a reduction in the economic
costs of cancer. Specifically, I use large
administrative databases from Canada
to estimate how the employment effect
of a cancer diagnosis is moderated
by medical innovation. I employ a
difference-in-differences strategy
combined with matching to estimate
the causal effect of a cancer diagnosis
and how it changes with medical
innovation.

Confirming previous research, I first
find that a cancer diagnosis reduces
employment by 2 to 4 percentage
points. Second, the cumulative
medical innovation that improved
cancer treatment during the 1990s and
2000s led to a decrease in the negative
employment effects of prostate and
breast cancer by about 65 percent.
Hence, the approval of additional drugs
and the introduction of other medical
technologies over this time period are
associated with a substantial reduction
in the economic costs of cancer.
Finally, I consider the employment
effects of cancer diagnoses and
medical innovation by cancer patients’
education. I find that the benefits of
innovation are limited to individuals
with postsecondary education, while
cancer patients with lower levels of
education experience a larger decline in
employment.
From a policy perspective, these
results suggest that innovations in
cancer treatment may provide benefits
beyond direct medical effects. As
innovative cancer treatments can be
very expensive, it is therefore important
to account for economic benefits such
as smaller reductions in labor income
and, as a result, tax revenue when
determining whether the benefits
of a new treatment option outweigh
its cost. The heterogenous effects

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Innovations in cancer treatment may alleviate the economic costs of cancer diagnoses, such as a decline of labor supply.
n I find that medical innovation reduces the negative employment effect of cancer
diagnoses by about 65 percent during the study period.
n The economic benefits of medical innovation are limited to cancer patients with
postsecondary education, raising concerns about equal access to new treatments.
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by education indicate that the mere
existence of new medical technology
may not automatically lead to improved
economic outcomes, but rather that
there are barriers to access them.
Background
The most common types of cancers
are breast and prostate, affecting
about 26,000 women and 21,000 men,
respectively, in Canada annually. While
most cancers affect older individuals,
a substantial subgroup of breast and
prostate cancer patients is diagnosed
during their working age. Because
cancer treatment is lengthy and can
cause severe side effects, patients
undergoing treatment often reduce
their labor supply or stop working
completely. These negative labor market
effects may be alleviated by improved
treatment options that are more likely
to cure cancer in a shorter amount of
time and lead to fewer side effects.
To investigate the effect of cancer
diagnoses and medical innovation on
employment, I combine data from
several sources. First, I identify breast
and prostate cancer patients from the
Canadian Cancer Database. Second,
I use individual tax returns from the
Longitudinal Worker File to measure
employment of cancer patients before
and after their diagnosis, as well as
employment of individuals who were
never diagnosed with cancer and who
serve as a control group. Statistics
Canada merged these data sets to the
1991 population census, which contains
individual characteristics such as
educational attainment.
Finally, I measure medical
innovation in two different ways. A
first, more narrow measure is the
number of drugs that are approved for
the treatment of breast and prostate
cancer. Pharmaceutical innovation is
important, as chemotherapy is one of
the main treatment options for cancer.
Throughout the study period, the 1990s
and 2000s, several important new drugs
were approved—the chemotherapy
drug Trastuzumab for the treatment
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of breast cancer, and triptorelin, a
luteinizing hormone-releasing hormone
analogue used to fight prostate cancer.
In addition to chemotherapy,
surgery and radiation are used as cancer
treatment. Notable innovations include
laparoscopic radical prostatectomy, a
minimally invasive surgical technique,
and breast-conserving surgery, both
of which reduce recovery time and
potential side effects after surgery. To
broadly capture innovation in these
areas, I use international patent data.
From these records, I construct a
quality-weighted patent index that
measures the aggregate and cumulative
innovative activity related to breast and
prostate cancer treatment.
Before I estimate the effect of cancer
diagnoses and medical innovation
on employment, I use a matching
technique to create a control group
consisting of individuals without cancer
that is identical to cancer patients along
all observed dimensions. I then employ
a difference-in-differences strategy—I
compare employment rates of cancer
patients and the matched control
group both before and after the cancer
diagnosis. I consider a five-year window

before and after the diagnosis and
allow the employment effects of cancer
diagnoses and medical innovation to
vary over time, as it is plausible that
these effects do not remain constant
within this time frame.
Results
I find that some breast and
prostate cancer patients reduce their
employment after the diagnosis when
compared to the matched control
group. Men are 1.8 percentage points
less likely to be employed after a
prostate cancer diagnosis, and women
are 3.9 percentage points less likely
to be employed after a breast cancer
diagnosis.
Medical innovation substantially
reduces the negative employment
effects of cancer diagnoses. Figure 1
shows the effect of a prostate cancer
diagnosis on employment as a function
of the number of drugs available for the
treatment of this disease. In 1992 when
14 drugs were approved, employment
of prostate cancer patients dropped by a
few percentage points initially, and the
decline reached more than 5 percentage

Figure 1 Effect of Prostate Cancer on Employment by Number of Approved Drugs
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points after three years (blue line; I
show the effects prior to the diagnosis
to rule out any preexisting trends). In
contrast, when 27 approved drugs were
available in 2010, a prostate diagnosis
reduced employment by only about 1
percentage point during the first five
years (red line).
For the employment effects of
breast cancer diagnoses and the role
of medical innovation, Figure 2 shows
a similar pattern. As the number of
drugs approved for the treatment of
breast cancer increased from 17 to 39
between 1992 and 2010, the decline
in employment following a diagnosis
became smaller. At the lowest level
of pharmaceutical innovation, breast
cancer reduces employment by about
2.5 percentage points initially and up to
5 percentage points three years after the
diagnosis and beyond (blue line). At the
highest number of drugs available, the
initial decline in employment is similar,
but after three years, the employment
effect becomes indistinguishable from 0
(red line).
When repeating this exercise with
the quality-weighted patent index
instead of the number of approved

drugs, I find similar patterns (not
shown). Hence, I provide evidence
suggesting that medical innovation in
the form of new drugs and medical
technology alleviates the economic
costs of breast and prostate cancer
diagnoses. On average, medical
innovation reduced the decline in
employment among cancer patients
by about 65 percent between 1992
and 2010. These effects imply that the
annual average earnings losses due to
a prostate and breast cancer diagnosis
are $1,100 and $600, respectively, lower
than they would have been without
medical innovation. Therefore, a
substantial economic benefit arises
from these innovations, in addition to
any resulting reductions in mortality
and morbidity.
To better understand how education
interacts with medical innovation in the
employment of cancer patients, I split
the sample by educational attainment
into individuals without a high school
degree, those who have graduated
from high school but have no further
education, and those with at least some
postsecondary education. Among these
subsamples, I only observe a mitigating

Figure 2 Effect of Breast Cancer on Employment by Number of Approved Drugs
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This is despite the fact that individuals
with lower levels of education reduce
their employment by more than those
with postsecondary education.
Although my data do not allow
me to determine the underlying
mechanism, there are several potential
explanations for the observed
heterogeneity by education. First,
higher levels of education may help
cancer patients identify medical
providers who use innovative
treatments. Second, education may
enable cancer patients to obtain
information on treatment options and
demand that their medical providers
use up-to-date treatments. Third,
adherence to complex treatment
regimens could be facilitated by higher
educational attainment. Finally, it is
possible that cancer patients with low
education levels work in physically
more demanding jobs where it is
more difficult to undergo a modern
high-intensity cancer treatment while
remaining employed. Independent of
the actual mechanism, the fact that only
highly educated individuals profit from
innovative cancer treatments suggests
that the economic benefits of medical
innovation are distributed unequally.
Implications

0

-0.05
Effect of diagnosis at minimum innovation
Effect of diagnosis at maximum innovation
-0.1
-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

Years since diagnosis
SOURCE: Statistics Canada and author’s calculations.

6

2

3

4

5

The empirical findings have several
important implications. First, they
highlight the importance of accounting
for indirect (economic) benefits in a
cost-benefit analysis of new medical
technologies. Although the benefits
in terms of lower earnings losses are
smaller by an order of magnitude than
the annual cost of an intensive cancer
treatment, which can exceed $100,000,
the benefits are substantial. Therefore,
they should be considered in addition
to potential improvements in terms of
mortality and morbidity.
Second, these findings suggest
potential policies that can alleviate
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the economic costs of disease. It is of
particular concern that cancer patients
experience lower employment rates and
hence earnings losses in addition to the
pain and suffering caused by their disease.
Thus, encouraging and subsidizing medical
innovation may have the dual benefit of
mitigating both the medical and economic
consequences of cancer and other diseases.
Investments in research that lead to new
treatment options may very well have a
positive return if the resulting innovation
has economic in addition to medical
benefits.
Last, the fact that medical innovation
does not yield economic gains for cancer
patients with lower levels of education
raises concerns about unequal access to
up-to-date treatment options. Especially
when medical research is publicly
financed, it is reasonable to expect that
resulting innovation should benefit cancer
patients irrespective of their demographic
or socioeconomic background. Moreover,
in the case of the employment effects
of cancer diagnoses, individuals with
the lowest levels of education suffer
the highest economic cost. Therefore,
policymakers may need to ensure that
new and innovative treatment options are
accessible to all patients who would benefit
from them, such as through information
campaigns targeted at these individuals.
In addition, medical education could
increasingly emphasize the importance of
accounting for patients’ socioeconomic
backgrounds in choosing appropriate
cancer treatments.
In sum, these findings highlight the
importance of considering interactions
between labor markets and health care and
point out several policy options aimed at
reducing the economic burden of disease.
This article draws on research from an Upjohn Institute working
paper, which can be found at https://research.upjohn.org/
up_workingpapers/306.
R. Vincent Pohl is an assistant professor at the University of
Georgia.
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New from the Upjohn Press
Food Stamps and the
Working Poor
Peter Mueser, David Ribar, and Erdal Tekin
The authors examine detailed administrative
data from three states—Georgia, Missouri, and
South Carolina—and find that state rules and
regulations often deter eligible low-income
workers from receiving benefits while presenting
hurdles for those who are already eligible to
recertify for
benefits. The
effects of various
certification and
recertification
policies are a key
focus of the book,
but the authors
also discuss the
impacts of the
relaxed provisions
that make it
easier for able-bodied adults without dependents
to receive food stamp benefits. They also
critique a variety of policy proposals to alter the
program, and offer several proposals for making
the program less onerous for working families
and individuals while addressing valid program
concerns.
June 2019
138 pp. $15.00 pbk ISBN 978-88099-660-0.
Also see https://research.upjohn.org/up_
press/256/.

Strengths of the Social
Safety Net in the Great
Recession
Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance and
Unemployment Insurance
Christopher J. O’Leary, David Stevens, Stephen A.
Wandner, and Michael Wiseman, Editors
During the Great Recession, many who lost
their jobs became eligible for Unemployment
Insurance (UI) and often Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance
(SNAP), too.
Many already
receiving SNAP
lost jobs and
became eligible
for UI. While
both programs
were stressed,
they proved
flexible enough
to respond to the
needs of many of the victims of the recession.
But little has been known about how the two
programs interact. The chapters in this book show
that, indeed, each program has considerable
effects on the other and that policies governing
them could be improved. Following chapters
that detail the SNAP and UI programs along with
existing research on their interaction, the editors
use administrative data from six states to reveal
how the programs interact and how they can be
altered to work more effectively.
July 2019
430 pp. $35.00 pbk ISBN 978-0-88099-663-1
PDF is free at https://research.upjohn.org/
up_press/257/.
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